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1. Distinct background concerns
Social ontology – Pettit
- Rovane: Gilbert, Tollefsen, Velleman …
Distributed cognition/ extended mind
- Clark, Hutchins, Kirsh, Tribble
Collaborative/ transactive/ relational memory
- Moral psychology (eg Sue Campbell)
- Social-developmental-cognitive psych
(Wegner, Hirst, Nelson, Fivush)
- And in the social sciences post-Halbwachs
1. Putting them all together??
Collaborators:
Amanda Barnier and Rob Wilson
The wishful aim: distinct but mutually-
informing empirical & conceptual
investigations of the nature and
functions of shared remembering
Core cases: small-group remembering
1. Overall aims, & how today fits
To get at
 costs & benefits of shared memory
 parameters of group influence &
mechanisms/ processes of sharing
 fate of shared memories
Among the challenges:
naturalistic ontology of group memory?
relevant varieties of groups?
memory & temporally extended agency?
relation between empirical & conceptual?
1. Plan
Draw on Pettit-style picture of group agency in
social ontology to test its applicability to
the case of memory
Sketch Pettit-style picture of group agency
Find lessons about true plural subjects, and
about some roles for memory within the
social-ontological scheme
Sketch very rough analysis of shared memory
2. Joint action vs group agency
Pettit & Schweikard 2006
‘Our performance X is a joint action’:
We each intend that we perform X
We each intend to do our bit in performing X
We each believe that others intend to do their bit
This belief causes us to each intend to do our bit
We each believe in common that all this holds
Is there a single collective intending subject here (Gilbert)?
Or even a single ‘we-intending’ (Velleman)? No.
Joint action is necessary but not sufficient for group agency.
2. Some features of joint action
We do think and act as a plurality, and
easily recognize joint action as option
‘We are very good at recognizing what this
or that joint performance requires of us;
think of the versatility of footballers as
they concoct a joint move’
Or ‘I’ll go for a walk if you will’.
‘Then I will’. And off we go! (Velleman)
2. Some features of joint action
As a social species, ‘it is as if we go around,
advertising to others conditional intentions’,
assuming their presence in others, and
routinely accepting the invitations, ‘thereby
triggering cooperation’.
Meetings of incomplete intentions, leading to
joint action, can be banal and momentary.
And don’t require explicit deliberation ongoing
active self-monitoring for rational interest.
Far cry from ongoing committed group agency
3. Features of group agency
Apply in core cases to purposive groups, with
shared purposes, aiming at coordinated,
effective, credible judging and acting
These are integrated collectivities or ‘social
integrates’ (Pettit 2003)
Like individual agents, despite cognitive and
other performance limitations such groups
are and should be responsive to a range of
constraints on agency, on judgement, and
on action
3. Features of group agency
Like individual agents, group agents
seek consistency in judgements
are responsive to reasons & (have to) care
about making sense over time
‘keep track in intertemporal accounting’
Such agents will face discursive dilemmas, and
have mechanisms and procedures for dealing
with them, allowing possibility of ‘stark
discontinuity’ between group belief and beliefs
of many or all group members
3. Mutual awareness &
    plural subjects
Just as joint action is not sufficient for group
agency, so the complex webs of mutual
awareness which can (perhaps) ground
isolated shared beliefs or attitudes is not
sufficient for a truly plural subject
Mutual awareness is compatible with absence
of care for those constraints on reasoning
and action: such a collectivity can be ‘as
wayward in the postures it assumes as the
most casual aggregate of individuals’
3. Features of group agency
Purposive groups can’t always just revise
past collective judgements to support a
current collective view inconsistent with
those past judgements, ‘on pain of
becoming a laughing-stock’
They are answerable to past judgements
and actions; can be held responsible for
failures in ideals, for being (eg) ‘out of
kilter with earlier commitments’
Needs explicit deliberation: not tug-of-war
3. Discipline of self-regulation
Range of available strategies as ‘part of a
discipline of self-regulation in which
members can participate or be in some
sense complicit’ (List and Pettit 2005)
Among possible procedures for thus
collectivising reason are relaxations of
majority voting by distributing
responsibility for distinct decisions to
specialist subgroups (epistemic gains?)
4. Lessons from Pettit
1. Plural subjecthood has essential
diachronic dimensions
2. Some form of memory is required for
appropriate intertemporal tracking
3. We can specify a range of possible
kinds of groups, with distinct aims,
which fall short of full group agency
but still exhibit forms of joint action
5. Diachronic aspect of
    plural subjects
Creation of a novel centre of attitudes
and actions isn’t immediate
contra Gilbert: typical commitments &
expectations associated with even
transitory joint action (or eg mutual
belief on a single issue) arise from
the action (belief), not vice versa
5. Diachronic aspect of
    plural subjects
A true plural subject has a history:
relations of accessibility, trust, reliability
between members arise through the
pooling of wills over time
So how does the group keep track of its
history well enough to remain
sensitive to constraints of reason in
its ongoing decisions & actions?
6. Memory &
    intertemporal accounting
Pettit: a social integrate is an unusual
kind of intentional subject, ‘without
its own faculties of perception or
memory’, though it can register and
endorse facts perceived or
remembered by its members
Not because memory needs some
‘inherently mental material’ (funct-
ionalism should apply here too)
6. Memory &
    intertemporal accounting
What kind of memory does it have?
An effective group generates a history of
judgements that it is on record as making.
First suggestion: organizational memory
distributed over archives, technologies,
practices
Compatible with organization still being
responsible for its memories (both their
coherence and their tracking of truth)
6. Memory &
    intertemporal accounting
Second suggestion: groups have and
need memory, alongside their beliefs,
goals, attitudes, and linked actions
Some shared memories reducible to
shared beliefs about the past
Compare semantic memory in the
individual
What of shared episodic-like memories?
6. Memory &
    intertemporal accounting
Memory required in discursive dilemmas
when group must treat (eg) earlier
judgements as live, committing,
mattering, either owned or (in light of
dilemma) rationally disowned
And some ‘premises’ in discursive
dilemmas are themselves memories
Rational inferences often on the basis of
a mix of memories and beliefs
7. Memory & self-regulation
A third suggestion about the kind of
memory groups have and need links
memory to self-regulation
Compare individual self-regulation, on
(eg) a Velleman-style picture
Memory is vital for us to maintain some
consistency between my life stories
and my life
7. Memory & self-regulation
Eg strong feedback loop from reflective self-
representation in memory to action, living
out ongoing integration between self-
ascribed character, memories, plans, & life.
Narratives produce the actions they recount
A matter of degree: both reported and actual
memories can be more like a PR report,
floating free of causal processes behind
firm’s (self’s) action
7. Velleman on life & stories
Life follows stories most obviously as we
make up actions on the fly: ‘I’m going
for a walk’, or ‘I won’t take the lolly’
Incomplete desires and narratives filled
out in momentary self-talk
We make up our lives as we go, an
epistemic openness which can spread
across people in joint action
7. Velleman on life & stories
Self-fulfilling self-narratives of memory,
in this two-faced form
Narrative influences memory: I
remember what I did and what
happened to me in part according to
my self-conception (social psych)
And memory influences life: choices and
actions driven in part by content of
ongoing activities of remembering
7. Memory, life, & stories
Dual temporal cross-referencing in
memory
Not just between present and past
(memory caused by the experience to
which it refers)
Also distinctive forward-looking features
and functions of remembering
7. Memory & self-regulation
Bridges between individual and social
functions of remembering
a) development and maintenance of full
autobiographical memory may
depend on relational & social supports
b) identity and well-being of full group
agents involves memory in support of
training, relationships, group aims …
8. Shared memory:
    groups and members
Link back to empirical work
And to initial analysis
Clear differences between memories    a)
accidentally held in common
b) shared memories without active
collaboration in remembering
    c) active group collaboration in re-
evaluation of shared memories
8. Looking for the strongest case:
    shared memory of joint action?
1. We acted jointly (then)
2. Each of us remembers acting jointly
3. Each of us remember this because of our
past joint action
4. It is common knowledge among us that we
have mutually intentionally expressed
willingness jointly to remember joint action
5. Our remembering activities are responsive
to ongoing constraints of group goals
8. Shared memory
Such shared memory, whether of joint
actions or not, brings characteristic
commitments and expectations of
plural subject phenomena
Forms of epistemic openness in memory
coexist with causal constraints
8. Shared memory
Can there be the stark discontinuities between
the group and the members characteristic
of the genuine group agent when faced (eg)
with the discursive dilemmas?
Many different things happen where there is
(re)negotiation of either disputed or
incomplete memories in a group with a
history and some shared purposes
9. Shared memory on
  incomplete resources
Eg empirical studies of collaborative
inhibition in sharing memories
Even a simple aggregate group without
history remembers better than any
individual but worse than the sum
Do real groups (families, friends,
committees etc) have better
aggregation procedures?
9. Shared memory on
  incomplete resources
Eg William Hirst on role of dominant narrator
in family remembering
Eg Robyn Fivush on dictatorial, isolated, and
coordinated styles of family remembering
Many ways of merging, selecting, negotiating
memory content which depend on the
distinct nature and mechanisms of groups
